קָדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים שֶׁשְּׁחָטָן בַּדָּרוֹם, מוֹעֲלִים בָּהֶן. שְׁחָטָן בַּדָּרוֹם וְקִבֵּל דָּמָן בַּצָּפוֹן, בַּצָּפוֹן וְקִבֵּל דָּמָן בַּדָּרוֹם, שְׁחָטָן בַּיּוֹם וְזָרַק בַּלַּיְלָה, בַּלַּיְלָה וְזָרַק בַּיּוֹם, אוֹ שֶׁשְּׁחָטָן חוּץ לִזְמַנָּן וְחוּץ לִמְקוֹמָן, מוֹעֲלִין בָּהֶן. כְּלָל אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ, כֹּל שֶׁהָיָה לָהּ שְׁעַת הֶתֵּר לַכֹּהֲנִים, אֵין מוֹעֲלִין בָּהּ. וְשֶׁלֹּא הָיָה לָהּ שְׁעַת הֶתֵּר לַכֹּהֲנִים, מוֹעֲלִין בָּהּ. אֵיזוֹ הִיא שֶׁהָיָה לָהּ שְׁעַת הֶתֵּר לַכֹּהֲנִים. שֶׁלָּנָה, וְשֶׁנִּטְמְאָה, וְשֶׁיָּצְאָה. אֵיזוֹ הִיא שֶׁלֹּא הָיָה לָהּ שְׁעַת הֶתֵּר לַכֹּהֲנִים. שֶׁנִּשְׁחֲטָה חוּץ לִזְמַנָּהּ, חוּץ לִמְקוֹמָהּ, וְשֶׁקִּבְּלוּ פְסוּלִין וְזָרְקוּ אֶת דָּמָהּ: Offerings of the most sacred order that were disqualified before their blood was sprinkled on the altar, e.g., if one slaughtered them in the south of the Temple courtyard, and not in the north as required, are subject to the following halakha: One is liable for misusing them, i.e., one who derives benefit from them must bring a guilt offering and pay the principal and an additional one-fifth of their value. If he improperly slaughtered them in the south of the courtyard and properly collected their blood in the north, or even if he properly slaughtered them in the north of the courtyard but improperly collected their blood in the south, although the more significant rite was performed improperly, one is liable for misuse if he derives benefit from the animals. The same halakha that applies if the location of the sacrificial rites was altered likewise applies if the time of those rites was altered. Accordingly, if one properly slaughtered them during the day and improperly sprinkled their blood at night, or if he improperly slaughtered them at night and properly sprinkled their blood during the day, one is liable for misuse if he derives benefit from the animals. Or in a case where one slaughtered them with the intent to partake of their meat or sprinkle their blood beyond its designated time, rendering it piggul, or outside its designated area, disqualifying the offering, he is liable for misusing them if he derives benefit from the animals. Rabbi Yehoshua stated a principle with regard to misuse of disqualified sacrificial animals: With regard to any sacrificial animal that had a period of fitness to the priests before it was disqualified, one is not liable for misusing it. Misuse applies specifically to items consecrated to God, which are not permitted for human consumption at all. Once the offering was permitted for consumption by the priests, it is no longer in that category. And with regard to any sacrificial animal that did not have a period of fitness for the priests before it was disqualified, one is liable for misusing it if he derives benefit from it, as it remained consecrated to God throughout. Which is the sacrificial animal that had a period of fitness for the priests? This category includes a sacrificial animal whose meat remained overnight after its blood was presented on the altar and therefore came to have the status of notar and was therefore disqualified, and one that was disqualified when it became ritually impure, and one that left the Temple courtyard and was thereby disqualified. All of these disqualifications transpired after consumption of the sacrificial meat was permitted, and therefore one who derives benefit from these offerings is not liable for misuse. And which is the sacrificial animal that did not have a period of fitness for the priests? It is a sacrificial animal that was slaughtered with the intent to partake of it or sprinkle its blood beyond its designated time, or outside its designated area, or one that those unfit for Temple service collected and sprinkled its blood. All of these disqualifications took effect before consumption of the sacrificial meat was permitted. The offerings therefore remain consecrated to God, and one is liable for misuse if he derives benefit from them.
בְּשַׂר קָדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים שֶׁיָּצָא לִפְנֵי זְרִיקַת דָּמִים, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר, מוֹעֲלִין בּוֹ, וְאֵין חַיָּבִין עָלָיו מִשּׁוּם פִּגּוּל, נוֹתָר וְטָמֵא. רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר, אֵין מוֹעֲלִין בּוֹ, אֲבָל חַיָּבִין עָלָיו מִשּׁוּם פִּגּוּל, נוֹתָר וְטָמֵא. אָמַר רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, וַהֲרֵי הַמַּפְרִישׁ חַטָּאת וְאָבְדָה, וְהִפְרִישׁ אַחֶרֶת תַּחְתֶּיהָ, וְאַחַר כָּךְ נִמְצֵאת הָרִאשׁוֹנָה וַהֲרֵי שְׁתֵּיהֶן עוֹמְדוֹת, לֹא כְשֵׁם שֶׁדָּמָהּ פּוֹטֵר אֶת בְּשָׂרָהּ, כָּךְ הוּא פוֹטֵר אֶת בְּשַׂר חֲבֶרְתָּהּ. וְאִם פָּטַר דָּמָהּ אֶת בְּשַׂר חֲבֶרְתָּהּ מִן הַמְּעִילָה, דִּין הוּא שֶׁיִּפְטֹר אֶת בְּשָׂרָהּ: The mishna presents a dispute with regard to the status of offerings of the most sacred order, which normally are not subject to the halakhot of misuse once their blood has been sprinkled and they have been permitted to the priests. The case of the mishna is the meat of offerings of the most sacred order, whose consumption is permitted from the moment their blood was sprinkled, that left the Temple courtyard before the sprinkling of the blood, and then reentered the courtyard. Rabbi Eliezer says: The sprinkling of this blood does not permit its consumption by the priests. Consequently, one is liable for misusing it. And he is not liable for eating it due to violation of the prohibitions of piggul, if he partook of it after it was slaughtered with the intent to partake of it or sprinkle its blood beyond its designated time, or of notar, if he partook of the meat after it remained overnight, or of partaking of the meat while ritually impure. Rabbi Akiva says: The sprinkling is effective despite the fact that the meat left the Temple courtyard and was disqualified, and therefore one is not liable for misusing it. Likewise, other halakhot that apply to offerings whose blood was sprinkled apply to it, and consequently one is liable for eating it due to violation of the prohibitions of partaking of meat that is piggul, or notar, or remained overnight, or of partaking of the meat while ritually impure. Rabbi Akiva said, in support of his opinion: But there is the case of one who designated an animal as his sin offering and it was lost, and he designated another animal in its stead, and thereafter the first sin offering was found and both of them are standing fit for sacrifice. If he slaughtered both animals at the same time and sprinkled the blood of one of them, which means that the second was disqualified as a leftover sin offering, the question arises as to the status of the meat of the second animal with regard to the halakhot of misuse. Is it not the case that just as the blood of the animal whose blood was sprinkled exempts its meat from liability for its misuse, so too it exempts the meat of the other animal? Since he could have chosen to sprinkle the blood of either animal, they are considered as though they were one offering. If so, one may learn from there by an a fortiori inference with regard to the case of sprinkling the blood of meat that left the courtyard and returned: If the sprinkling of its blood exempted the meat of the other animal from the halakhot of misuse, it is only right that it should exempt its own meat that left the courtyard.
אֵמוּרֵי קָדָשִׁים קַלִּים שֶׁיָּצְאוּ לִפְנֵי זְרִיקַת דָּמִים, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר, אֵין מוֹעֲלִין בָּהֶן, וְאֵין חַיָּבִין עֲלֵיהֶן מִשּׁוּם פִּגּוּל נוֹתָר וְטָמֵא. רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר, מוֹעֲלִין בָּהֶן, וְחַיָּבִין עֲלֵיהֶן מִשּׁוּם פִּגּוּל, נוֹתָר וְטָמֵא: The mishna adds that just as Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva disagree as to whether the sprinkling of blood exempts meat that left the courtyard from liability for its misuse, so too, they disagree with regard to the sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity consumed on the altar that left the Temple courtyard before the sprinkling of the blood. The dispute is whether the subsequent sprinkling of the blood generates liability for misuse of those portions. Rabbi Eliezer says: The sprinkling of the blood is completely ineffective in rendering those portions consecrated to the Lord. Consequently, one is not liable for misusing them. And similarly, one is not liable for their consumption due to violation of the prohibitions of piggul, notar, or of partaking of meat while ritually impure. Rabbi Akiva says: The sprinkling is effective, and therefore one is liable for misusing them. And likewise, one is liable for its consumption due to violation of the prohibitions of piggul, notar, or of partaking of the meat while ritually impure.
מַעֲשֵׂה דָמִים בְּקָדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים, לְהָקֵל וּלְהַחֲמִיר. וּבְקָדָשִׁים קַלִּים, כֻּלָּן לְהַחֲמִיר. כֵּיצַד. קָדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים לִפְנֵי זְרִיקַת דָּמִים, מוֹעֲלִין בָּאֵמוּרִין וּבַבָּשָׂר. לְאַחַר זְרִיקַת דָּמִים, מוֹעֲלִים בָּאֵמוּרִים וְאֵין מוֹעֲלִין בַּבָּשָׂר. עַל זֶה וְעַל זֶה, חַיָּבִין מִשּׁוּם פִּגּוּל, נוֹתָר וְטָמֵא. וּבְקָדָשִׁים קַלִּים כֻּלָּן לְהַחֲמִיר. כֵּיצַד. קָדָשִׁים קַלִּים לִפְנֵי זְרִיקַת דָּמִים, אֵין מוֹעֲלִין לֹא בָאֵמוּרִין וְלֹא בַבָּשָׂר. לְאַחַר זְרִיקַת דָּמִים, מוֹעֲלִין בָּאֵמוּרִין וְאֵין מוֹעֲלִין בַּבָּשָׂר. עַל זֶה וְעַל זֶה, חַיָּבִין מִשּׁוּם פִּגּוּל, נוֹתָר וְטָמֵא. נִמְצָא מַעֲשֵׂה דָמִים בְּקָדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים, לְהָקֵל וּלְהַחֲמִיר. וּבְקָדָשִׁים קַלִּים, כֻּלּוֹ לְהַחֲמִיר: With regard to establishing liability for misuse of consecrated items, there is an aspect of leniency and an aspect of stringency in the act of sprinkling the blood of offerings of the most sacred order. But with regard to the sprinkling of the blood in the case of offerings of lesser sanctity, it contains in its entirety aspects of stringency, i.e., there are only aspects of stringency. How so? The status of offerings of the most sacred order is that before the sprinkling of blood, one is liable for misusing their sacrificial portions that are to be burned on the altar, and for misusing the meat that is to be eaten by the priests. Since the meat is prohibited prior to sprinkling the blood, it is in the category of items consecrated to God, which are subject to the halakhot of misuse. After the sprinkling of the blood of offerings of the most sacred order, one is still liable for misuse of their sacrificial portions, as they remain prohibited to be eaten and are in the category of items consecrated to God, but one is not liable for misuse of the meat, as it is now permitted for consumption by the priests. This explains how there is an aspect of leniency in the sprinkling of the blood of offerings of the most sacred order. By contrast, for consumption of both this, the sacrificial portions, and that, the meat, after the sprinkling of the blood, one is liable to receive karet due to violation of the prohibition against consumption of piggul, and the prohibition against consumption of notar, and the prohibition against consumption of sacrificial meat while ritually impure. Consequently, the act of sprinkling blood of offerings of the most sacred order is found to contain an aspect of leniency and an aspect of stringency. But with regard to the sprinkling of the blood of offerings of lesser sanctity, all of their aspects are of stringency. How so? The status of offerings of lesser sanctity is that before the sprinkling of the blood, one is not liable for misuse, not for their sacrificial portions nor for the meat. After the sprinkling of the blood, one is liable for misuse of their sacrificial portions, but one is not liable for misuse of the meat. This explains how the sprinkling of the blood in the case of offerings of lesser sanctity causes a stringency in terms of the halakhot of misuse. And for consumption of both this, the sacrificial portions, and that, the meat, after the sprinkling of the blood, one is liable to receive karet due to violation of the prohibition against consumption of piggul, and of the prohibition against consumption of notar, and of the prohibition against consumption of sacrificial meat while ritually impure. Consequently, in the act of sprinkling the blood of offerings of lesser sanctity, it is found that all of their aspects are of stringency.